AXIOMATIC-BASED APPROACH FOR DEVELOPMENT OF TRUSTWORTHY AND FAULT-TOLERANT SYSTEMS
Abstract and keywords
Abstract (English):
The article proposes an approach on the ground of axiomatic bases, that allows to formalize a solution of number of problems of development and verifi cation of fault-tolerant and trustworthy systems. The article states the provisions and objectives of this axiomatic-based approach. It is shown that the approach is consistent with the experience of fault-tolerant and trustworthy systems engineering, and allows to improve its fault tolerance and safety, to carry out a comparison of system fault tolerance, to maintain the balance between the fault tolerance and the complexity of development and verifi cation, to apply formal methods of prove, to formalize the integration of systems, to improve and to evaluate the level of diversity without the involvement of independent groups of developers and experts, and to formalized develop and verify system, detecting its own failures. Moreover, the approach makes it possible to solve the current problems of fault-tolerant and trustworthy systems, such as the formalization of methods for intraprocessor control, and of development of its realization conditions, as well as the proof of suffi ciency of the diversity of developed and verifi able systems.

Keywords:
fault tolerance, safety proof, formal methods, formalization, diversity, failure detection
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